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Lecture summary 
 
Memory is thought to be about the past. The past is a problem in conflict transformation. 
This lecture suggests memory can also be about the future. It introduces the notion of 
remembering forwards, which is contrasted with remembering backwards. The distinction 
between these two forms of remembering defines the burden of memory in post-conflict 
societies generally and specifically in Ireland. In societies emerging out of conflict, where 
divided memories in part constituted the conflict, social memory privileges remembering 
backward. Collective and personal memories elide within social memory to perpetuate 
divided group identities and contested personal narratives.  Above all, social memory works 
to arbitrate the future, by predisposing an extreme memory culture that locks people into the 
past. Forgetting the past is impossible and undesirable. What is needed in societies 
emerging out of conflict is to be released from the hold that oppressive and haunting 
memories have over people. This lecture will suggest that this is found in the idea of 
remembering forwards. This is not the same as forgetting. It is remembering to cease to 
remember oppressive and haunting memories. It does not involve non-remembrance but 
active remembering: remembering to cease to remember the past. While the past lives in us 
always, remembering forwards assists us in not living in the past. Remembering forwards 
thus allows us to live in tolerance in the future despite the reality that divided memories 
endure and live on. The lecture further argues that these enduring divided memories need to 
be reimagined by the application of truth, tolerance, togetherness and trajectory.  The lecture 
suggests that it is through remembering forwards with truth, tolerance, togetherness and 
trajectory that people in post-conflict societies can inherit the future despite their divided 
pasts and live in tolerance in the midst of contested memories.    
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It is a privilege to be invited to speak to you today and I thank the organisers for their 
invitation. I would like to use the auspicious occasion of your ordination – and a joint one at 
that between the Anglican and Methodist traditions – as an opportunity to clarify and codify 
my thoughts on how people in societies emerging out of conflict can learn to live together in 
tolerance despite contested memories.   
 
The symbolism of this theme should not be lost on those who know church history between 
Anglicanism and Methodism. This very occasion therefore adds resonance to my argument 
that while the past always lives in us, we do not have to live in the past. 
 
Memory, of course, is about the past. The past is a problem in conflict transformation. This 
lecture suggests memory can also be about the future. It introduces the notion of 
remembering forwards, which is contrasted with remembering backwards. The distinction 
between these two forms of remembering defines the burden of memory in post-conflict 
societies generally and specifically in Ireland. Remembering forwards is a way in which 
people in societies emerging out of conflict can live with troubled pasts and inherit a shared 
future at the same time. 
 
In arguing that we can approach the future with optimism irrespective of our divided past, I 
need to begin my reflections by unpacking two sets of rather complicated relationships. I will 
suggest that the notion of remembering forward is useful for reconceptualising the 
relationship between the past, present and the future, as well as the relationship between 
collective and personal memories. It is through this concept that, to use the words of the 
famous Christian Mennonite peace studies specialist, John Paul Lederach, we can 
reimagine the past and remember the future.  
 
In short I will be addressing today how we might approach a shared future through our 
divided memories. For that I will suggest we need a new approach to memory, one that 
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integrates the future with the present and the past. I proffer that we find this approach in 
what I call remembering forwards.  
 
The idea of remembering forwards is deeply religious. All religions look forward to a time to 
come. Eschatology, though, is particularly prominent in the three Abrahamic faiths, whose 
central tenant is about inheriting the final destiny in the future. Remembering forwards is also 
much beloved by poets, artists and playwrights who have used their skills to inspire hope to 
build a better future. The Czech playwright, Vaclav Havel, for example, who became his 
country’s first post-Communist president, stressed the importance of rethinking the future for 
his country’s healing. Remembering forwards as a concept also fits neatly into the emerging 
discourse in social science on hope, although it is not the same as hope. Hope is about 
aspirations to a better future; remembering forward is about how we might get to this future 
through managing the problem of divided memories. 
 
In the course of this lecture I will outline what I mean by remembering forwards and explore 
what remembering forwards means for us in Ireland. Let me start, however, by reiterating the 
problems that can arise in post-conflict societies when we only remember backwards. 
 
Let me state a prosaic truism at the outset. The Irish – and latterly the Northern Irish conflict 
– was in part constituted by memory. Divided and contested memories are wrapped up in 
the process of identity formation that has sculpted two mutually exclusive identities on the 
island of Ireland.  Nations, societies and groups have always been defined in part by their 
collective memories, which disclose images, narratives and representations of the past that 
assist in constructing moral boundaries and senses of solidarity.  Any collectivity is in large 
measure defined by its shared memories.  Where nations, societies and groups are divided 
within and between themselves, this division is to some degree always constituted by 
contested memory.  
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Collective memories, however, are also personal memories, for where identification with the 
collectivity is strong, the memory images, narratives and representations that mark the 
group’s collective memory are perceived as personal, part of the individual’s past. They may 
not be personal remembrances – death soon takes those with personal recollections of 
group events; but these non-experienced representations of the past form part of the 
individual’s social memory.  
 
The notion of social memory is a recent concept but is now a term in wide currency. It is 
used by memory studies specialists to capture this idea that collective memories that define 
the group are simultaneously personal and individual memories, and that these personal and 
individual memories have consequences at the societal level because of their collective 
dimension.  
 
Social memories involve personal memory and collective memory at the same time; it is a 
term useful for bridging the distinction between individual and group memories.  Let me 
explain how. 
 
Social memories survive death. Living memory, as it is called, does not limit the effect that 
social memory has in making group events personal.  The Easter Rising and the Battle of 
the Somme, for example, are foundational events to people today not because people 
survive who can remember them but for their role in shaping the sense of identity people 
have now. They become personal not as a result of people’s remembrances but because 
they are part of the social memory, experienced as personal but defining the group that 
shares them. They affect people still and shape to a certain extent who they define 
themselves as being. This is because they identify with the group whose collective memory 
appropriates these events as foundational to their social and moral boundaries. 
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In surviving death, social memories survive the centuries – even the millennia. Christ lives 
today because early Christianity in first century Palestine is experienced as personal, part of 
the Christian’s social memory that defines their group identity as Christian. So it is that the 
1641 Massacre, for example, is a personal hurt for many still today, as is Cromwell’s 
slaughter in Drogheda in 1649; and onwards down the centuries of Ireland’s divided past.   
People place themselves in historical events of which they have no direct or living memory 
because these events are experienced as personal as a result of their group loyalties. In this 
way we live the present through the past.   
 
However, this is only one side of the Janus-face that is the past and present. We do not only 
live the present through the past as a result of social memory. We also approach the past 
selectively through the present. In this decade of commemoration in Ireland it has become a 
tired cliché that memories have meaning only because of the present. What this means is 
that social memory selectively appropriates the past in order to speak to the present.  
 
The 1916 Easter Rising is a topical way to illustrate this. Most Northern Unionists 
approached the Rising through the prism of the Provisional IRA, locating it as an 
undemocratic use of violence against a legitimate state. Anti-Sinn Fein politicians and 
commentators in the South saw it as glorification of a movement that bore no mandate then 
and which they despise now; while others in the Republic celebrated it as a signal event in 
the national narrative that eventually won independence from colonial rule. The 1916 Rising 
thus variously speaks to concerns in the present like anti-imperialism, the birth of modern 
Ireland, Northern Ireland’s ‘Troubles’, and vituperative electoral competition with modern 
Sinn Fein. We make of memory what the present impels us to. 
 
The idea of social memory therefore gives us two maxims for thinking about the relationship 
between the present and the past. First, the present is lived through the past.  People locate 
themselves in historical events of which they have no direct remembrance because these 
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travails are foundational to the groups with which they identify, resulting in them being 
perceived as personal. In this way people can appropriate history to affirm collective affronts 
and hurts as personal ones, or experience group triumphs as individual achievements and 
honours. Secondly, the past is understood through the present. People appropriate 
selectively from the past in order to comment on current events that dominant their personal 
concerns and group loyalties, making the past a tool for mobilisation.   
 
Both maxims involve an indivisible connection between personal and collective memory, 
inasmuch as social memory bridges the two and sees their connection as recursive, each 
affecting the other. Nor are the maxims contradictory. Memory is a lived experience that 
transcends time. It does not need to be directly experienced in time and space for it to be 
part of someone’s lived experience, for the group’s past is perceived as personal and 
perceived to have continued and enduring personal relevance for group relations in the 
present.  
 
Social memory thus compresses time. Post-conflict societies do not experience the past in a 
serial order of time but a concurrent one, in which the distance between the past and the 
present is compressed into a simultaneous experience. Present day circumstances affect 
how the past is interpreted and events long ago cry to the present as if they were here and 
now. 
 
In these ways, social memory turns memory into a symbolic object, a socially constructed 
artefact. It is not a collection of actual events; it is a representation of the past.  It is 
constructed artfully for social purposes. Memory is appropriated to understand the present, 
as well as something lived in the present. Disentangling the past from the present therefore 
is not possible because present factors tend to distort the recollections of the past. 
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From the vantage point of post-conflict societies therefore, remembering backwards through 
social memory can falsify actual events, for representational memories can distort and 
misperceive them, nourishing anger and resentment and encouraging false 
aggrandisements.  
 
It is for these reasons that memory is integrally tied to conflict and for these reasons also 
that memory is a burden in peace processes, as Miroslav Volf, the Christian theologian, 
once argued in relation to the Balkan wars following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.  
 
The problem is that remembering backwards also affects the connection between memory 
and the future.  
 
Remembering backward by means of social memory can in societies emerging out of 
conflict, make the past an arbiter of the future.  The past can become the arbiter of the future 
because the past as it is represented in social memory is thought by most people to be the 
actual past; so imagined hurts are real, collective affronts are personal, aggrandisements are 
forms of ethnic honour, and the present is an unchanging continuance of how the past is 
thought to be. There is no moral vision about a shared future, merely a concern – perhaps 
even a morbid obsession – with the past.  
 
The future is refracted through the past in this way because post-conflict societies tend to 
develop what we might call pathological memory cultures. Memory cultures contrast 
significantly with the amnesiac cultures of more socially cohesive societies. The fast pace of 
modern life in contemporary cosmopolitan society means that most people pay little attention 
to the past or the future. Their lives are lived in the heady here-and-now, the hedonistic and 
immediate concerns of daily family life.  The ubiquity of social media in late modernity 
intensifies this sense of immediacy, facilitating people to live in the moment since the whole 
globe comes to their screen as an instantaneous present.  
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Amnesiac cultures, however, are deeply paradoxical, for simultaneous with the memory 
blindness of everyday life, cultural commentators tend to urge greater respect for memory. 
Authors, poets, scholars, theologians, and even clinical psychotherapists write of the 
importance of a healthy regard for memory, extolling memory as giving us depth, setting us 
free, and healing and enriching us. However, if memory is on the cultural – and medical – 
agendas of advanced cosmopolitan societies, it is not part of what sociologists like to call the 
practical habitus of the ordinary person in everyday life: the shallow, lived experience of now, 
which  we call the present, is their primary concern. 
 
We can contrast a healthy regard for the past in normal memory cultures with the 
pathological memory cultures found in societies emerging out of conflict, where life is 
experienced largely through the past and society is thought thus to change little. Memory 
almost becomes morbid in these extreme memory cultures. If amnesiac cultures have too 
little memory, memory cultures in post-conflict societies have it in excess. 
 
There are at least two conditions under which post-conflict societies are particularly prone to 
develop memory cultures. The first is where conservative forms of the Abrahamic faiths 
dominate. In such circumstances orthodox and traditional religious interpretations invoke an 
unbroken continuity with ancient times, predisposing covenantal ideas and a ‘Chosen 
People’ status, preaching an elective affinity between religion, identity and the land, and 
having conservative forms of religious culture. It is no coincidence that covenantal theology, 
Chosen People status and the elision of territory, religion and identity feature in a great 
number of memory conflicts. Incidentally, usually the Christian Church is a good example of 
a balanced memory culture; seeing the present and the future in terms of the past – the 
Christ event.  In Northern Ireland, however, Christianity has become wrapped up in a 
pathological memory culture, with Christ appropriated to be on competing sides at the same 
time.  As I have written before, in being perceived to be part of the problem, the Church in 
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Northern Ireland found it difficult to be perceived as part of the solution, which significantly 
constrained its involvement in the peace process. 
 
The second condition that predisposes post-conflict societies to descend into particularly 
extreme memory cultures is when the transition is problematic or challenged, with groups 
mistrusting the carefully negotiated second-preference peace agreement and remaining 
loyal to mutually-exclusive first preferences. Processes of cultural reproduction sustain and 
disseminate the ancient cleavages and divisions, weakening and slowing what I call the 
social peace process; relationships main broken, conflict journalism abounds, communities 
remain divided, and wounds are deliberately kept open. Injury and offence are hung onto 
tenaciously as part of their zero-sum identity and the present is thought to have enduring 
continuity with the past. Erstwhile enemies can share different senses of the past and have 
little sense of a shared future. People can transfer the physical war of the past into a culture 
war that involves conflict over, amongst other things, memory, memory symbols and 
symbolic representations of the past. 
 
I would like to draw attention to two unfortunate consequences of the extreme memory 
cultures we find in post-conflict societies. First, these memory cultures tend to valorise the 
tradition of the long dead, making the burden of self-sacrifice, spilled blood and martyrdom of 
previous generations literally a dead weight on the future. The very opening sentence of the 
1916 Easter Rising proclamation, for example, refers to the dead generations through which 
Ireland gets her tradition of nationhood; and the Rev Ian Paisley, too, regularly invoked the 
blood of the martyrs in that evocative evangelical preaching style of his. The dead weight of 
the past slows entry into the future by encouraging renewed forms of violence in honour of 
the spilled blood of the martyrs, and by squeezing the space for compromise and flexibility.  
 
Secondly, memory cultures lose perspective about the future. I have said many times that if 
truth is the first casualty of war, perspective is the first casualty of peace, as people lose 
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sight of how far things have changed and how much the peace process has progressed. 
Memory cultures focus on continuity with the past, on how little has changed, rather than on 
what little remains to be achieved to realise a shared future. 
 
The best way to understand the effect of memory cultures is to try and visualize driving a car 
forward by only looking in the rear view mirror.  There is a good reason why the rear view 
mirror is so small compared to the windscreen. The rear view mirror permits only a narrow 
and concentrated view backwards; the windscreen is very much larger and permits a greatly 
widened angle. The vision is comprehensive and encompassing. And, perhaps most 
significantly, everyone in the car can see through it. Only the driver sees through the rear 
view mirror. It is exclusive in its vision, not inclusive; it is individualised, not communal; and it 
will inevitably lead to disaster if it is the only perspective taken. A car driven by looking only 
in the rear view mirror will not get to the end of the driveway. Every driver in this room knows 
however, that equal ruin awaits if we decline to use the rear view mirror at all.   
 
In refusing to make the past an arbiter of the future, I am not advocating we forget about the 
past; that we ignore the rear view mirror, as it were. The past always lives in us as an ever 
present; we cannot forget it. In post-conflict societies, it is impossible to forget: the empty 
chair at the dinner table, the constraints of the prosthetic limb or wheelchair, the annual 
painful anniversary, the constant media coverage that makes entertainment or political 
capital out of victims’ pain, these are constant reminders that make forgetting impossible.  
 
It is often said that those who forget their past are destined to repeat it. In formulating this 
aphorism George Santayana obviously had his adopted home of Spain in mind.  But even if 
we might prefer not to remember a divided past, as indeed Franco Spain did, as a result of 
the past living in us in some way or other as a legacy, forgetting it is out of the question. 
Post-Franco Spain after all has learned that it has had to recover forgotten memories of its 
civil war.  
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This brings me to the crux of this lecture: how can we not live in a past that is ever present? I 
tender the idea of remembering forwards. 
 
The ‘Troubles’ live on in trauma, in mistrust, fear and broken relationships; they survive in 
peace walls that exist both as architecture on the streets and in people’s heads, in street 
artwork that enshrines one group’s fidelity and the other’s treachery, and they endure in 
divided memories and contested moral frameworks through which the former violence is 
understood. It is precisely in this sort of situation that we need to approach the past through 
the future, to remember the future as Lederach’s aphorism puts it; or, as I call it here, to 
remember forwards.  
 
Let me start my depiction of remembering forward by pointing out that Santayana said 
something fundamentally different to how he is forever quoted; including being quoted by 
David Ervine on gable walls in East Belfast. He never used the word forget; he used the 
word remember instead. Those who fail to remember the past are condemned to repeat it.  
 
Failing to remember is not the same as forgetting. To forget is to excise from memory; to 
wipe out and to destroy. You cannot tell a bomb victim or someone disabled by an army 
rubber bullet to forget; it cannot be excised from memory. Nor should it be; and the memory 
certainly should not be destroyed. To forget victims – all victims, not selected ones – is to 
victimise them twice. 
 
Failing to remember is to deliberately remind oneself not to recall it; it is to remember to 
cease to remember. In ancient Athens there was an annual ritual in the temple in which 
worshippers were reminded to continue to cease to recall their defeat in war.  Failing to 
remember, in other words, involves a conscious act of remembrance in a way that forgetting 
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does not. It involves memory in a future-oriented act: avoiding repetition of the past by 
remembering to cease to remember the past. This is what I mean by remembering forwards. 
 
The Christian theologian Miroslav Volf writes of something like this when he refers to what 
he calls ‘non-remembrance’. It is not the same as forgetting. He sees it as releasing the 
memory, not forgetting it; letting go of oppressive and haunting memories so that they no 
longer have power over the person. It is their hold over us, not the memory itself, which is 
released by non-remembrance.  
 
I am unsure about Volf’s phrase, since non-remembrance needs to involve an act of 
remembrance; we need to remember not to remember it. What I like about Santayana’s 
maxim is that it suggests we need constantly to remember to put the past behind us; it 
involves a conscious decision to remember not to let the past that lives in us keep us locked 
in the past.  That is what the term remembering forward involves and that is why I prefer it 
rather than non-remembrance. 
 
In order to avoid being misunderstood, I want to clarify what remembering forwards is not. 
 
First, it is not about developing a common memory. Georges Erasmus, a First Nation leader 
in Canada, echoed the collective memory literature when once he said that where common 
memory is lacking, where people do not share the same past, there is no real community. 
Where community is to be formed, common memory must be created.  However, in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict, where emotions and pain remain very raw, the idea of 
agreeing the past is illusionary.  Remembering forwards is a way in which we can progress 
to the future while still living without common memories.  
 
Secondly, remembering forward is not cultural amnesia. Living together in tolerance despite 
divided memories does not require the sorts of policies of cultural amnesia practised in post-
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partition India, Franco Spain or post-genocide Rwanda, where public policy in the media, in 
school history curricula and in the civic sphere omits mention of the past and where 
legislators make it illegal even to talk of it. Amnesia is also illusionary. Public repression of 
social memory like this coexists with many millions of private memories in which the past 
remains ever present. With cultural amnesia, public repression of the past keeps it alive in 
countless acts of private memory resistance.  
 
Let me draw out then the implications of this argument for a popularly canvassed strategy for 
dealing with the past in Northern Ireland that advocates drawing a line under it. 
 
Living together in tolerance with divided memories will not happen by drawing a line and 
forgetting, erasing and wiping away the past. Memory resistance will keep the past alive. 
Living together in tolerance with divided memories will only happen if we transcend the hold 
that divided memories have on us by remembering to remember not to allow this past to 
distort our future. I take this to be what Lederach means by remembering the future and 
Santayana by remembering in order to avoid the future being a repeat of the past.  It is 
expressed well by Ahmed Kathrada, an Indian Muslim born in South Africa and a former 
political prisoner, who once said that South Africans should not forget apartheid but 
remember it selectively in ways that facilitate consensus over a shared future. 
 
This captures what I mean by remembering forwards. 
 
Remembering forward, however, is only half the solution; we need to rethink the divided 
memories that will persist into the future. Remembering to cease to remember memories 
that oppress and haunt us, takes us only part of the journey into the future.  
 
John Paul Lederach refers to the need for post-conflict societies to reimagine the past. The 
contested lenses through which the past is perceived may make this reimagining difficult, but 
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I share his view that societies emerging out of conflict need to revisit those divided 
memories.  
 
I would like to isolate four features that mark the approach we should adopt toward the 
enduring divided memories that will persist within what I call remembering forwards. In a 
fondness for alliteration I call them truth, tolerance, togetherness and trajectory. 
 
Truth is about remembering events as they occurred, not as they are selectively perceived in 
subsequent symbolic representations of the past. As I said over a decade ago when I first 
argued that memory could be a peace strategy, re-remembering the past is imperative. Re-
remembering is more than remembering the forgotten events and the unremembered 
victims; it is about consciously putting things back together again as they actually occurred 
not as they are misrepresented in social memory. This includes remembering uncomfortable 
things about the past that do not fit the narrative built up around them. It includes 
remembering our own acts of commission and omission that disclose our culpability for the 
past and our contribution to its divisive nature. It means owning up to our own wrongs. 
Acknowledgement is thus critical to truth. Untruthful memory actually dismembers, not 
remembers, the past; it keeps it apart and mutilated. Untruthfulness does an injustice to 
memory, for as Volf puts it, untruthful memory is unjust memory.  
 
Truth, however, must be tempered with tolerance, for very bad and evil things did actually 
happen in the past. These bad and evil things are shown in people’s torn bodies and torn 
minds. Tolerance moderates the effects of truth. Tolerance requires respect for competing 
narratives and acceptance that others will see these events differently, allowing us to 
recognise that this selectivity of memory is normal and should not be amplified into sculpting 
mutually exclusive identities. Tolerance is not about seeing the past through another’s 
standpoint – near nigh impossible in the aftermath of conflict – but accepting that the other’s 
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standpoint is as valid to them as yours is to you. Tolerance is about respecting differences 
rather than eliminating differences; it is about honouring diversity rather than us becoming all 
the same.  
 
Truth and tolerance can be accelerated by togetherness. There are two features of 
togetherness that are relevant to divided memories; togetherness in the act of remembering 
the past, and togetherness in what it is that is remembered. Remembering together is a 
liberating form of memory, for sharing divided memories together facilitates acceptance of 
the other’s standpoint and encourages the tolerance I have just advocated.  I also believe 
that the past can be excavated for what over ten years ago I called ‘joint remembrances’. 
Joint remembrances describe historical events that we can now see were shared rather than 
separated, reflecting common experiences rather than divided ones. Joint memories like 
these are often excised from social memory and can emerge some time later precisely to 
challenge the divisive narratives, much now as we remember the many Catholics whose 
blood was spilled on the Somme in service of the British Crown.   
 
Truth, tolerance and togetherness, however, all need to be contextualised by trajectory. 
Trajectory is about looking forward rather than backwards. What we remember and how 
public commemorations are practised should reflect that we all have to inherit a shared 
society in the future. Remembering in ways that keep us in the past will only delay that 
future. Trajectory is about remembering to cease to remember the divisiveness and 
contentiousness of disputed memories, reminding us not to live in the past but to remember 
the future. It is precisely this trajectory that distinguishes what I have called remembering 
forwards.  
 
Let me conclude by drawing my arguments together. In societies emerging out of conflict, 
where divided memories in part constituted the conflict, social memory privileges 
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remembering backward. Collective and personal memories elide within social memory to 
perpetuate divided group identities and contested personal narratives.  Above all, social 
memory works to arbitrate the future, by predisposing a memory culture that locks us into the 
past. Forgetting the past is impossible and undesirable. What is needed in societies 
emerging out of conflict is being released from the hold that oppressive and haunting 
memories have over people. I have argued that this is found in the idea of remembering 
forwards. This is not the same as forgetting. It is remembering to cease to remember 
oppressive and haunting memories. It does not involve non-remembrance but active 
remembering: remembering to cease to remember the past. The past lives in us always; 
remembering forwards assists in us in not living in the past. Remembering forwards allows 
us to live in tolerance in the future despite divided memories that endure and live on. I have 
suggested that these enduring memories, however, need to be reimagined by the application 
of truth, tolerance togetherness and trajectory.  
 
To quote the words of Elie Weisel, writer, Nobel prize-winner and Holocaust survivor, ‘a 
community that does not come to terms with the dead will continue to traumatize the living.’ 
Remembering forwards, with truth, tolerance, togetherness and trajectory, allows us to 
inherit the future despite our divided pasts, and to live in tolerance in the midst of contested 
memories, thereby assisting us to come terms with the dead in order to help the living.   
 
Thank you very much. 
 
